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RECENT CASES
WELFARE LAW-ALABmAM's "SUBSTITUTE FATHER" REGULATION RULED
INVALID
Mrs. Sylvester Smith and other public welfare recipients were removed
from Alabama's federally-funded Aid and Services to Needy Families with
Children program (herein referred to as AFC)1 between June, 1964 and Jan-
uary, 1967. Mrs. Smith had allegedly cohabited with a Mr. Williams, himself
married and a father of nine children, in violation of a regulation of the Alabama
Department of Pensions and Security, the so-called "substitute father" regula-
tion,2 and therefore was precluded from receiving aid under the AFC program
for herself and her four minor children beginning on October 1, 1966. The
family would have been eligible for such aid under the program if not for the
Alabama regulation. On November 8, 1967, Mrs. Smith and other petitioners
similarly situated brought a class action against Ruben King, Commissioner of
the Alabama Department of Pensions and Security, and other administrators,
in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama seeking
a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief enjoining the enforcement of the
regulation. A three-judge court 3 decided for the plaintiffs on the grounds that
the regulation violated both the Social Security Act and the Equal Protection
Clause of the fourteenth amendment.4 On direct appeal to the Supreme Court,5
held, non-suitability of a child's home is not a proper criterion for denying all
welfare aid to a needy child. Further, the Alabama definition of "parent" con-
flicts with § 406a of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.§ 606(a), and is invalid.6
The equal protection argument was not reached. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309
(1968).
Subchapter IV of the Social Security Act, 7 Aid and Services to Needy
Families with Children, was first presented to the Congress on January 17, 1935,
after six months of study and planning by the Committee on Economic Security.
The Subchapter replaced the financially inadequate Mother's Pension Laws,
passed by 46 states during the years 1909-1911, which provided financial security
for the benefit of fatherless children. In 1934, the total annual expenditure of
these Mother's Pension programs was approximately 33 million dollars, ranging
from $9,312 in Louisiana to 12 million dollars in New York. However, even the
latter figure represented only 93 per capita in the union's largest state. 8 The
Congressional documents at the time of the adoption of the AFC program were
1. Subchapter IV of the Social Security Act, §§ 401-410, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§
601-610 (1964). The program was originally known as "Aid to Dependent Children," 49
Stat. 627 (1935). In the 1962 amendments to the Act, however, the name was changed to
"Aid and Services to Needy Families with Children," 76 Stat. 185 (1962).
2. Alabama Manual for Administration of Public Assistance, Pt. I, c. II, Section VI.
3. 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1959).
4. 277 F. Supp. 31 (Ala. 1967).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1959).
6. 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-610 (1964).
8. H.R. Rep. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. Table VI, 11 (1935).
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replete with evidence that the AFC was initiated in order to shelter the un-
protected children who were regarded as the "most tragic victims of the depres-
sion." 9 For example, the majority report to the Senate concluded that "the
heart of any program for social security must be the child."'1 ° The House report
declared that,
One clearly distinguishable group of children, now cared for through
emergency relief, for whom better provision should be made, are those
children in families lacking a father's support. Nearly 10% of all fam-
ilies on relief are without a potential breadwinner other than a mother
whose time might be best devoted to the care of her young children."
Significantly, the federal government decided to contribute one-third (now
more than three-fourths, depending on the number of aid recipients in the
family) of the funds needed for the program in each state that decided to par-
ticipate in the AFC project,' 2 as long as the state prepared an aid distribution
plan which conformed with the purposes of AFC, was administered properly,
encompassed the entire state, and was satisfactory to the Secretary of Health,
Education and Welfare.'3 Congress gave the states the right to administer AFC
according to local standards of need14 and to establish a residency requirement
as a prerequisite for the receipt of aid, for a period not to exceed one year.'0
In the absence of a statutory duty, and despite the Secretary's wide discre-
tion to withhold federal funds if the state plan did not furnish aid "with reason-
able promptness to all eligible individuals," the states based the eligibility of
a family to obtain aid on the "moral character" of the parent. 1 The latitude
given to the states in formulating the above policy led to abuse. Alabama used
this "suitable home" or "moral fitness" eligibility determination as a basis for
denying welfare benefits to petitioners herein.
In addition to need determination standards, residency laws, and the
"suitable home" criteria, the states have invented numerous methods, either by
legislation or by administrative regulation, that exclude undesirable families from
the AFC program, irrespective of actual need. A home could be declared "unfit"
if the parent did not foster religion.' 7 As a prerequisite for obtaining public
assistance, social workers forced mothers to sign statements promising not to
meet men at any time.' 8 In many jurisdictions, the welfare department carried
9. Id. at 9.
10. S. Rep. No. 661, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1935).
11. H.R. Rep. No. 615, supra note 8, at 10.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 603 (1964).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 602(b) (1964).
14. U.S. DEP'T or HEALT, EDUCATION, AND WaIXARE, HANDBOOK or PUBLIC Assis-
TANCE AiD STRATION, Pt. IV, § 3120. (herein referred to as HANDBOOK).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 602(b) (1964).
16. H.R. Rep. No. 615, supra note 8, at 24; S. Rep. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess..
36 (1935).
17. W. BELL, AID TO DEPENDENT CHmIDREN, 33 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Am TO
DEPFNDENT C-LREN].
18. Id. at 48.
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on "midnight searches" of welfare recipients' homes to locate a "phantom hus-
band" after receiving a tip from a neighbor or passerby.' 9 Some jurisdictions did
not allow aid-recipient mothers to house male boarders as a source of extra
money.20 Other restrictions included forcing the mother, even if she had a one
year old child, to seek employment if available anywhere in the community (thus
leaving the child without adequate supervision) ,21 summarily denying aid if a
family had any delinquent children,22 stopping assistance to families in which
children over ten years would not work in the harvest during a recess,23 refusing
assistance if a parent was "tubercular,"24 and conditioning welfare benefits on
a quota system based on race.2 5 Some legislatures entertained the idea of steril-
ization as a condition for receiving funds.2 6 The press also heightened public
criticism of the welfare situation by exaggerating welfare frauds and depicting
the system as one of wholesale fraud and gross immorality.27 The states' virtual
control of the federally-financed program was further strengthened by a govern-
mental policy of acquiescence in state de facto control because of the adminis-
trative fear of aid cutbacks by Congress if the program, already severely
criticized, stirred up greater controversy. The people who had the most to gain
by publicizing their unfair treatment and desperate plight had the highest rate
of illiteracy and no money with which to appeal administrative decisions, or
even serve a complaint alleging unfair treatment.28 This further increased the
free reign allowed to the states when administering welfare policy. Finally, the
most recent weapon in the states' arsenal to restrict benefits to needy families,
i.e., the "substitute father" or "man-in-the-house" regulation, was introduced.
Alabama, relying on its amorphous ability to allocate aid, first contended
that denying benefits because of the "unsuitability" of the home would discour-
age illicit sexual relations and illegitimate children. Echoing the Mother's Pen-
19. Id. at 87. These abusive searches have been used to their fullest extent in Washing-
ton, D.C. Although initial attempts to have these warrantless searches declared unconstitu-
tional failed, Smith v. Board of Commissioners of District of Columbia, 380 F.2d 632, the
regulation authorizing these searches was declared invalid in Stewart v. Washington, 14 Wel.
L. Bull. 7 (1968), for failure to obtain the district commissioner's approval. However, the
California Supreme Court had termed these harassing welfare searches in violation of the
fourth amendment, unless the county could show compliance with the standards governing
searches for evidence of crime. Parrish v. Civil Service Commission of Alameda County, 35
U.S.L.W. 2583. Recent United States Supreme Court restrictions as to administrative searches
(necessitating a warrant) lend further weight to the conclusion that the "midnight searches"
will soon be declared unconstitutional. Camara v. Municipal Court of the City and County of
San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523. See HANDBoox, supra note 14, §§ 2220, 2230. See generally,
Reich, Midnight Welfare Searches and the Social Security Act, 72 YALE LJ. 1347 (1963).
20. Am TO DEPENDENT CHILnREN, supra note 17, at 118.
21. Id. at 82. See generally, Note, Federal Judicial Review of State Welfare Practices,
67 CorLm. L. REv. 84, 88 (1967).
22. AID TO DEPENDENT CH=LD=, supra note 17, at 13.
23. Conditioning of Welfare on Child Labor Attacked, 12 War.. L. Buri. 1 (Sept. 1968).
24. AM To DEPENDENT CnDREN, supra note 17, at 7.
25. Id. at 35.
26. Id. at 71; Note, Aid to Families with Dependent Children-A Study of Welfare
Assistance, 44 DENVER L.J. 102, 117 (1967).
27. Am TO DEPENDENT CHDREN, supra note 17, at 61.
28. Id. at 83.
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sion philosophy, and strongly enforcing the "moral character" requirements,
only the "fit" or "worthy" poor were allowed to receive welfare. A child was
eligible for funds only when he lived in a "suitable home," i.e., conforming to
the caseworker's or the general community's subjective opinion of "suitable
home." Whether a mother was divorced, deserted, separated, or unmarried were
all qualities determinative of her "moral fitness." In most jurisdictions, social
workers strongly felt that to financially support a parent's desertion of a child
or to support illegitimate chlidren would have the effect of placing a premium
upon these social evils. As one social worker stated, "Perpetuating homes which
produce such results (crime, illegitimacy, and desertion) would be both un-
charitable and unwise." 29 Therefore, the children of widows, the incurably
insane, and prisoners serving long-term sentences were in the best position to
receive aid. The social workers were less interested in protecting the innocent
children in "unsuitable" homes, in recognizing that environment created unstable
marital patterns and resultant illegitimacy, and in employing the financial re-
sources at their disposal to ameliorate the ills incident to poverty, than they
were in eliminating these families from the welfare rolls by applying middle
class standards to lower-income class situations. Winifred Bell also points out
that,
Although few details emerge from the unstatistical past, it is apparently
true that most "fit and deserving" widows were white.8 0
Probably because of the subjectivity and arbitrariness of classifying a home as
"unsuitable," the above statement was especially true in the South, where the
proportion of Negroes in the caseload was considerably smaller than in the child
population. One field supervisor in the South reported,
[t]he number of Negro cases is few due to the unanimous feeling on
the part of the staff and board that there are more work opportunities
for Negro women and to their intense desire not to interfere with local
labor conditions. The attitude that they have always gotten along, and
that "all they'll do is have more children" is definite.,,
The practice of AFC, namely, ".... [to] encourage the care of dependent chil-
dren,"32 thus became distorted since the neediest children, in many cases, were
denied aid. In 1941, thirty-one of the forty-five states participating in AFC had
some type of "suitable home" requirement, 83 but enforcement depended upon
local attitudes toward illegitimacy and the causes of poverty. A step toward
eradicating eligibility criteria not based on need occurred in 1940 when the
Social Security Bureau issued its first official statement on "suitable home"
requirements, recommending that
29. Id. at 7.
30. Id. at 9.
31. Id. at 34.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1964).
33. AID TO DEPENDENT CHILDRm, supra note 17, at 30.
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[a] ssistance... be given... where standards are, or with the aid of the
state department, can become such as to protect the interests and
welfare of the child.34
However, after World War II, the existence of widespread unemployment, the
increased racial tension, the emigration of the rural poor to the cities, the
growing and prosperous middle class, the greater attention on family breakdown,
and a rising community awareness of welfare, exposed the children's aid program
to attack for allegedly encouraging illegitimacy and shiftlessness among the
poor by providing monies for immorality. Winifred Bell explains,
Americans still believed that they lived in Utopia where worldly re-
wards awaited all individuals who made sufficient and appropriate
effort.3 5
By 1960, twenty-three states had some "suitable home" requirement for welfare
eligibility. This criterion for allocating benefits, however, was never tested as
broadly or as severely as Louisiana did in 1960. In July, 1960, Louisiana reduced
its welfare rolls by 22,501 children (95% Negro) after local AFC administrators
enforced new legislation declaring that a home in which an illegitimate child
has been born subsequent to the receipt of public assistance would henceforth
be considered "unsuitable," and therefore, ineligible for aid.36 This crisis
precipitated the Fleming ruling which put a restriction on the states' latitude
in erecting "suitable home" requirements, or in the formulation of similar regula-
tions based on the "moral character" of the parents, as a basis of denial of aid
to the innocent child.3 7 That ruling declared that the use of the "suitable home"
criteria as a basis for denial of all benefits, in any jurisdiction, was inconsistent
with the purpose of AFC unless the child was removed from the improper en-
vironment.
The second reason for discontinuing welfare funds to petitioners was due
to the broad construction of the word "parent" by the Alabama Department of
Pensions and Security. The basis for aid under the AFC subchapter is Ahe
"dependent child" who is a needy child,
who has been deprived of parental support or care by reason of the
death or continued absence from the home... of a parent, and who is
living with his father, mother, or [any one of other specified rel-
atives] .38
Aid can only be granted if a parent of the needy child is continuously absent-
from the home. Alabama, by invoking the "substitute father" theory, created'
34. Id. at 36.
35. Id. at 58.
36. Id. at 139.
37. State Letter No. 452, Bureau of Public Assistance, Social Security Administration,
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.
38. 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1964); furthermore, 42 U.S.C. § 608 includes as a "dependent
child" one who has been removed from the home of a relative to either a private home, a
foster home, or a public child-care agency.
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a parent and thereby denied public assistance to an otherwise eligible family
because there was no longer a dead or absent parent. The Alabama regulation
stated:
An able-bodied man, married or single, is considered a substitute father
of all the children of the applicant .. . mother ... [if] ... he lives in
the home with the child's natural or adoptive mother for the purpose of
cohabitation . . . [or if] . .. he visits [the home] frequently for the
purpose of cohabiting with the child's natural or adoptive mother...
[or if] ... he does not frequent the home but cohabits with the child's
natural or adoptive mother elsewhere.39
It was irrelevant whether the "substitute father" was already married, was the
child's natural father, or whether he had voluntarily agreed or was legally
obligated to support the family. This regulation clearly did not conform to
Alabama statutory and common-law rules concerning legal obligation to support
or capacity to enter into marriage.40 Furthermore, the regulation implied that
it was irrelevant whether the "man-in-the-house" actually contributed finan-
cially for the support of the family. Alabama, in defense of this lack of inquiry
into actual support, argued, logically and correctly if we accept the "substitute
father"-parent equality which Alabama presupposes, that eligibility for aid un-
der section 606a is dependent upon the number of parents in the home, not
whether they support the child. Therefore, such an investigation into parental
support was rendered unnecessary and placed families with an informal marital
arrangement in which there were two parents (albeit one a substitute parent)
on an equal basis with those having the ordinary marital relationship with two
parents at home. By flatly denying benefits when there was any other parent
or quasi-parent of the dependent child, Alabama had gone further than any
other jurisdiction which had "substitute father" statutes or regulations, except
South Carolina, Georgia, and the District of Columbia. All other jurisdictions
which had "man-in-the-house" provisions within the welfare laws permitted
the "substitute father's" contribution (if any) to the family to be one factor
in determining family need and, by so doing, kept within the Act.41 By 1967,
39. Supra note 2.
40. Under Alabama statutes, a legal duty of support is imposed only upon a "parent,"
who is defined as (1) a "natural legal parent," (2) one who has "legally acquired the custody
of" the child, and (3) 'the father of such child... though born out of lawful wedlock."
However, under the Alabama regulation in question, substitute parenthood is not based
upon whether the man-in-the-house is the natural father of the child or whether he had
voluntarily agreed or was legally obligated to support the child. ALA. CODE tit. 34, §§ 89, 90
(1961) ; ALA. CODE tit. 27, 12(1), 12(4) (1958). Law v. State, 238 Ala. 428, 191 So. 803
(1939). Similarly, Alabama cannot contend, as a further defense of its regulation, that the
duty of child support descends upon any man who "cohabits" with a woman because marriage
is presumed from the relationship. Alabama law, while recognizing common law marriage
under Ala. Code tit. 34, § 9 (1961), holds that marriage may be contracted in that state only
by parties "competent to so contract . . . by mutual and actual agreement." Rogers v.
McLeskey, 255 Ala. 148, 142 So. 526, 527 (1932). Thus, a man already married is not com-
petent to contract, while even "cohabitation" with an unmarried man cannot be presumed
to substantiate a marriage unless there has been actual agreement to marry.
41. See Kern County v. Coley, 40 Cal. Rptr. 53 (1964); People v. Bailey, 95 Cal. 2d
628
RECENT CASES
a total of twenty-three jurisdictions had some type of "substitute father" pro-
vision. The popularity of these restrictions with welfare critics grew quickly
after 1962.
As states recognized that they ran an exceedingly high risk of losing
federal funds if they explicitly excluded childreir on the basis of birth
status (suitable home requirement), they turned their attention to
alternative methods of defining eligibility so that much the same
result could be achieved less obviously and within the legal framework
of the Social Security Act.
42
In the instant case, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's verdict
"without reaching the constitutional issue."48 The Court's approach was to in-
validate the Alabama regulation as being inconsistent with the requirement of
the Act "... that aid to families with dependent children shall be furnished
with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals." 44 Alabama, as a first
defense, argued that (the policy of) denying aid to families in which the mother
is carrying on an illicit relationship discourages immorality and illegitimacy.
The Court disposed of this defense by reciting the Congressional reaction in the
manner of new legislation after the Fleming ruling of 1960. Congress enacted
section 404(b) of the Act,45 which permits states, without losing federal funds,
to deny aid to children who live in "unsuitable homes," but only if these children
are granted other care and assistance. The Court emphasized that
the statutory approval of the Fleming Ruling, however, precludes the
States from otherwise denying AFC assistance to dependent children
on the basis of their mother's alleged immorality or to discourage illeg-
itimate births.... Congress has determined that immorality and illeg-
itimacy should be dealt with through rehabilitative measures rather
than measures that punish dependent children, and that protection of
such children is the paramount goal of AFC.46
The Court also disposed of Alabama's second justification for its aid restrictions
-namely, the "substitute father" doctrine. The analysis began by placing the
AFC program in historical perspective. As previously stated, a "dependent child"
is a needy child who had been deprived of dual parental support, and had only
one parent or guardian to look to for support. The Court then examined the
Congressional debate before passage of the Social Security Act to elicit the
intent of the Act. The Court viewed, in particular, the economic hardships at
214, 360 P.2d 39, 11 Cal. Rptr. 543 (1961) ; People v. Rozel, 28 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1958) ; see
42 U.S.C. § 602 (a) (7); compare New York State Department of Social Welfare Regulation
§ 353.3 in conjunction with New York City Welfare Department Informational Bull. 66-23
(July 6, 1966) with N.J. Categorical Assistance Budget Manual § 502 and Miss. State Dept.
of Pub. Wel. Regs. Vol. 3, § D, p. 4512.
42. An TO DEPEMENT Cmm w, supra note 17, at 76.
43. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 341, 346 (1945) (concur-
ring opinion of Justice Brandeis).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (9) (1964).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 604(b) (1964).
46. 392 U.S. 309, 322-23 (1968).
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the time of the depression, and the statements in both the'House and Senate Re-
ports evidencing the fact that "parent" as used by Congress in 1935 was syn-
onymous with "father" or "mother" in the legal sense. Therefore, only death,
incapacity, or desertion of a "parent" could deprive the family of a parent. The
Senate Report concluded,
[m]any of the children included in relief families present no other
problem than that of providing work for the breadwinner of the family.
These children will be benefitted through the work relief program and
... through private industry. But there are. .. children in relief fam-
ilies that will not be benefitted [by these work relief programs]....
These are the children in families which have been deprived of a fa-
ther's support and in which there is no adult other than the one who is
needed for the care of the family. These are principally families with
female heads who are widowed,... or deserted.
47
The Congressional attitude, as interpreted by the Court, was that if the bread-
winner or parent was alive and capable of caring for his family, a child would
be ineligible for aid because private industry would provide job opportunity for
his father and the child would be adequately supported. But for families without
a father or breadwinner, relief would be necessary to prevent the psychological
and physical impairments caused by inadequate supplies of food and clothing.
Thus, the Congressional intent to provide security for all children would be
defeated if the Alabama regulation were able to deny aid to a family without
a "parent" simply because the spouse had a paramour who owed no legal duty
of support and protection to the child. The Court rejected the argument that
Congress wanted to exclude such a class of children. Finally, the Chief Justice
stated that the way in which "parent" is used throughout the Act corroborates
the Court's interpretation that a "substitute parent" is not a "parent" within
the scope of that term.48 Therefore, the Alabama regulation and similar regula-
tions or statutes of other jurisdictions which summarily deny aid if there is a
cohabiting paramour are invalid because they define "parent" in a manner
inconsistent with the plain meaning of section 406 (a) of the Act.49 Alabama had
breached the duty imposed under this section and if it desired to continue par-
ticipating in the AFC program, it must change its plan for public assistance to
conform with the Social Security Act. 50 Those jurisdictions which put the ordi-
nary marriage on an equal footing with the illicit relationship present in this
case cannot receive federal funds until they adhere to this opinion,1 because
the "substitute parent" has no legal duty to support the needy children, nor can
the jurisdiction force upon him the obligation to support the children, unless he
47. S. Rep. No. 661, supra note 10, at 17.
48. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 602 (a) (10).
49. 42 US.C. § 606(a) (1964). See HANDBooK, supra note 14, § 3414(4) which suggests
that only those persons with a legal duty of support are termed "parents."
50. See Ivanhoe Irrigation District v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 295 (1958); Oklahoma
v. Civil Service Commission, 330 U.S. 127, 143 (1947).
51. Supra note 50.
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voluntarily becomes their father, or is adjudged to be the natural father of the
children.
There are three important considerations which should be noted in regard
to the instant case. First, the Court did not wish to decide this case on constitu-
tional grounds. The Supreme Court did not reach the question of equal protec-
tion, while the district court decided the case on that basis. The district court
explained,
Some children cannot be classified as eligible and others ineligible
without a reasonable basis for distinguishing one class from the other;
classifications may only be created which are rationally related to the
purpose of the federal and Alabama Aid to Dependent Children stat-
utes .... The Alabama regulation directs that aid... not be given...
for an arbitrary reason-the alleged sexual behavior of the mother;
such a reason is wholly unrelated to the purpose of the Aid to Depen-
dent Children statutes. The basic purpose of the program... is to pro-
vide financial assistance to needy children who are deprived of the sup-
port and care of one of their parents.52
The district court was undoubtedly correct in saying that Alabama was looking
only to the conduct of the mother rather than to economic factors, and that a
mother's behavior and the "substitute father" regulation were unrelated to a
child's actual need. The district court was also correct in saying that such an
unreasonable determination, based upon the unrelated actions of the mother,
was a denial of the child's right to equal protection if the purpose of the Act was
to provide such aid; however, the provision for such financial aid was not the
purpose of AFC. Rather, Subchapter IV of the Act makes it clear that financial
assistance to the home is only one of the means of enabling a state to achieve
the purposes of the AFC program; Congress sought ". . . [to encourage] the
care of dependent children... ,'*1 to foster good citizenship, and to enable chil-
dren to begin their lives untainted by the physical and emotional problems af-
flicting the destitute. The latter two purposes are derived from Congressional
sentiment as revealed in the House and Senate reports at the time of the Act's
adoption. Therefore, an unconstitutional denial of equal protection can only
exist if there is no rational basis in accord with legislative intent in denying aid
to children with morally unfit mothers while granting aid to children with mor-
ally fit mothers." If financial aid were the only type of assistance available, it
could validly be said that there is a rational basis for such a determination. It
is true that financially supporting some unsuitable homes, by directly aiding the
head of the household, in light of the mother's possible use of the money, may
not accomplish any of the purposes of the Act. If the above analysis merely
restates the obvious, the district court could not properly say that equal protec-
52. 277 F. Supp. 31, 38-39 (1967) (emphasis added).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1964).
54. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 465-66
(1957).
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tion would be denied if monetary grants to the head of the household were the
only form of aid available. However, because direct financial aid is not the only
means to achieve the previously mentioned purposes of the Act, the equal pro-
tection argument still has much force. When other "adequate care and assis-
tance" may be granted under section 404(b) of the Act,r5 and the child may
be removed to a foster home pursuant to section 408,0 in lieu of direct financial
aid, there is no longer a rational basis classifying one child as eligible for aid
because his mother's conduct is acceptable, while another child is ineligible for
any aid because his mother is "unfit." Ideally, with alternative assistance pro-
grams, the child will no longer be menaced by the "unsuitable" conditions and
the aid will become as helpful to him as it would to a child from a "suitable
home." Therefore, the equal protection grounds could have been employed ef-
fectively here; however, the district court misinterpreted the purpose of the Act
and failed to state the proposition correctly.
An analysis of the equal protection argument's usefulness in this area is
not exhausted. Once it is established that a state has the obligation to assist a
child either in his own home, by other "adequate care and assistance," or by
removal to a foster home, the question must be answered with respect to the ap-
propriate standards with which to determine which form of aid should be given.
The federal courts did not have such a question before them in the present
controversy. The bases for removing a child from his home were not discussed.
It was decided only that all aid could not be denied a needy child if a home was
found "unsuitable." Certainly, if a jurisdiction enacts a regulation declaring a
home "unsuitable, ' '57 which in itself is grounds for removal of a child to a public
or private institution, potential welfare clients will withdraw from the AFC
program, or will fail to apply for benefits through fear that their children will
be taken away from them. In Florida, during the late 1950's and early 1960's,
when mothers who received aid were adjudged to have "unsuitable" homes which
could subject them to neglect proceedings in which their children could be taken
away, statistics demonstrate a large number of withdrawals from the AFC pro-
gram and a decrease in new applications for such aid-even prior to the case-
worker's inspection of the applicant's home and his declaration that it was "un-
suitable."58 The stigma of "unsuitable" and the possible loss of children through
court intervention was directly responsible for the decline in the number of aid
recipients.5 9 If other states enacted legislation similar to Florida's, it would
55. 42 U.S.C. § 604(b) (1964).
56. 42 U.S.C. § 608 (1964).
57. "Unsuitable home" has been interpreted as including a mother who meets men in or
out of her home, has a delinquent child, has no education, neglects her child, improperly
teaches the child manners, keeps alcohol in the house, has an illegitimate child after receiving
welfare, or performs any other "immoral" or "unworthy" act. But see In re Cager, 248
A.2d 384 (1968).
58. Am To DPmmNr CnwrDRa, supra note 17, at 130.
59. Florida Dep't. of Pub. Wel., Suitable Home Law 25-26 (1962), as quoted in Am
To DEPENDENT CnIDREN, supra note 17, at 132.
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result in increasing numbers of needy children being unable to acquire assistance
to which they are entitled. The states would also be actively breaching their*
statutory duty "that aid to families with dependent children shall be furnished
with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals. '60 In actuality, however,
the threat of child-loss is not part of a scheme of overall reduction of welfare
rolls (as already explained, AFC is not compulsory, but elective, upon the states,
and so they could entirely eliminate the program if that were its intention), but
rather the threat of child-loss is only aimed at reducing the number of aid
recipients for certain classes of people, ostensibly Negroes. Implementation of
the Florida legislation provides ".... much reason to believe that the new law
was aimed primarily at Negroes." 6' 1 Thus, Alabama or any other jurisdiction may
seek to dissuade Negroes from applying for aid through fear of child-loss by
broadly construing the federal statutes permitting dependent children either to
be removed to a foster home or to receive other "adequate care and assistance,"
if their homes are "unsuitable." Alabama may be able to accomplish by a strict
construction of the Social Security Act, and regulations, what it could not achieve
by using the "substitute-father" doctrine.62 Nevertheless, not only would such
a plan be open to objection for failure to provide assistance to all eligible in-
dividuals,"' but also may be opposed on equal protection grounds. Welfare
petitioners whose children are taken away may assert that classifications based
on small divergences from absolute morality or "suitability" for parenthood, so
as to deprive a parent of his child, are not rationally related to the purpose of
the Act nor are classifications based on small deviations from absolute standards
of morality "reasonable." Indeed, "[w]hen a legislative classification bears on
a vital personal right of anyone ... that classification is scrupulously examined
for reasonableness.10 4 Perhaps only gross immorality or neglect should deprive
a parent of his child. 65 Finally, equal protection may be lacking if a number
of Negro families are affected disproportionately by the strict imposition of
child-loss standards resulting in the elimination of a racial class from the welfare
rolls. 6 Such denial, whether occasioned by legislative act or administrative
60. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (9) (1964).
61. Am To DEPENDENT CmILDREN, supra note 17, at 130. By 1962, of the 17,999 homes
which bad been questioned for "unsuitability," 16,242 were nonwhite, although 39% of the
caseload was white.
62. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-610 (1964) and the Fleming ruling.
63. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(9) (1964).
64. Kirp, The Poor, the Schools, and Equal Protection, 4 HAxv. EDUC. Rxv. 635, 637
(Fall 1968); see Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 35 (1942) (sterilization); see generally,
Harvey, The Challenge of the Rule of Law, 59 MIcH. L. R1v. 608-9 (1961) in which the
author demonstrates how the equal protection clause can be used to protect certain
"ultimate values" considered fundamental in our society.
65. Am To DEPENDENT CHiLDREN, supra note 17, at 133-134 for a discussion for such a
Tennessee regulation.
66. See Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) ; Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954)
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
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policy, could be discovered by examination of the record in each case where
alleged.
6 7
The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision by construing the
statute rather than reaching the constitutional questions. The Court decided
that the term "parent" was not to be as broadly construed as Alabama had done
and therefore overruled the "substitute parent" regulation. Second, the Court
stated that 42 U.S.C. § 604(b), the Congressional reaffirmation of the Fleming
ruling, precluded a state from absolutely denying assistance to a needy child
unless other "adequate care and assistance" were granted with respect to such
child. No money allotments would be disbursed to any state until its AFC plan
conformed with this condition imposed by Congress.
The second significant aspect of this case bears on those issues which were
overlooked by the Court. This decision is treated as significant because it over-
ruled the "substitute father" regulation which flatly denied aid to a child when
a parent was living with a paramour who had no legal duty to support the for-
mer's children. However, the case is equally prominent because the right of
states to completely deny assistance to a family when a home is adjudged "un-
suitable" was also 6verruled. "Moral character" of the parent may still be taken
into account, apparently, because of the narrowness of the opinion, but no child
can be absolutely ineligible for assistance due to his parent's conduct. Never-
theless, even a token decrease in the amount of assistance to a child because of
his parent's conduct could be properly challenged on equal protection grounds.
The third important consequence of the instant case is that it signals the
emergence of a new body of welfare law. Before this case, the few welfare claims
actually litigated were either in state courts or lower federal courts. The Supreme
Court has recently decided a case concerning the imposition of residency re-
quirements as a requirement for welfare eligibility.68 Finally, it appears highly
probable that with the increased awareness of welfare problems, 9 increased
legal services available to the recipients of public assistance, 0 and the increase
67. See Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130 (1964); Maxwell v. Stephens, 348 F.2d 325
(8th cir. 1964).
68. Shapiro v. Thompson, - U.S. -, 89 S. Ct. 1322 (1969).
69. For example, (1) the determination of what a "parent' is, is still not settled; see
generally 15 WEr. L. BunL. 1,5 (1968); (2) maximum limits on welfare are being challenged;
see generally 10 WEL. L. B=xrr.. 4 (1967), 12 WE.r. L. BU-.. 4 (1968), 14 Wa.. L. BuLL. 4
(1968), 15 WEL. L. BuL.. 7 (1968) ; (3) there is alleged discrimination in public housing for
aid recipients; see generally 8 WEL. L. BxML. 3 (1967), 9 WE,. L. BULL. 7 (1967), 11 WEr,.
L. Bu rm. 7 (1968), 13 WEEL. L. Bu=. 16 (1968); (4) benefits are stopped without adequate
notice of prior hearing as required by 42 U.S.C. § 602 (a) (4) ; see generally 9 WVaL. L. BULL.
12 (1967), 12 Wa.L. L. Buxrx. 6 (1968), 13 XVar. L. Buar. 7,10 (1968), Note Withdrawal of
Public Welfare: The Rights to a Prior Hearing, 76 YALE L. 3. 1234 (1967); and (5) there is
concern over the confidentiality of welfare records as provided in 42 U.S.C. § 602 (a) (8)
(1964); see generally 12 WEL.. L. BuLL. 5 (1968).
70. Among the many groups which provide legal services are various legal aid societies,
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored Peoples, Mobilization for Youth,
and the American Civil Liberties Union.
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in the recipients' ability to be heard concerning the administration of a pro-
gram set up for their own benefit, we are witnessing only the beginning of
litigation in a previously overlooked area of law that affects millions of Amen-
cans daily.
CEARLES SHABSELS
